Is there an upper limit to the risks that humanitarian research may legitimately visit upon research participants? by Eyal, Nir & Passino, Kevin
Is there an upper limit to the risks 
that humanitarian research may 
legitimately visit upon research 
participants?
Nir Eyal
Ethics and Humanitarian Research: Generating Evidence Ethically
Nir Eyal declares having no relevant conflicts of interests.
Today’s talk
I. Introduction
II. Characterizing the notion of caps on legitimate risk to 
humanitarian research study participants
III. My arguments against such caps 
IV. Addressing others’ arguments for such caps
I. Introduction
Leading bioethicists express support for “upper 
limits”/caps on acceptable risk in research
• Frank Miller and Steve Joffe?
• Alex London
• Annette Rid and Dave Wendler
• David Resnik
When no benefit for participants expected, many 
research ethics guidelines/regs espouse caps on risk:
• E.g. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 2009; Emanuel et al. 2000; 
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 2002; South African 
Medical Research Council (SAMRC) 2002; Council of Europe (CoE) 2005; Indian Council of 
Medical Research (ICMR) 2006; Ad hoc group for the development of implementing 
guidelines for Directive 2001/20/EC (Ad hoc group) 2008; Schweizerische Akademie der 
Medizinischen Wissenschaften (SAMW) 2009; Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Bundesamt 
für Gesundheit (BAG) 2011; World Medical Association (WMA) 2013 (Rid 2014).
+ when participants’ valid consent unobtainable, such caps are low (Rid 2014).
+ when some benefits are expected, many would nonetheless condemn some studies of 
tremendous social value as, on balance, too risky for participants. 
+ for some research ethicists, the cap on net-risk from study participation should be ≤ 0. 
In short, many authors and guidelines 
would/should endorse: 
•Caps on acceptable risk: There is a level or a kind of 
risk such that visiting it upon study participants for 
study purposes alone is never permitted, no matter 
how socially important the study is. 
• Let me further characterize this position, before we turn to its critique.
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III. My arguments against caps 
on risk in humanitarian research
Four arguments against caps on risk in 
humanitarian research
1. Anti-absolutism
2. Caps’ initial intuitive appeal wanes in concrete cases
3. Medically high risk studies can remain (nearly) beneficial overall—
even in health terms.
4. Consent
1. Anti-absolutism
• Caps on risky medical studies constitute an absolute prohibition.
• But nearly all contemporary ethicists reject absolute prohibitions.
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2. Caps’ initial intuitive appeal wanes in 
concrete cases
• an outbreak of a highly infectious, extremely lethal strain of MERS 
starts at a civil war zone. Either standard containment strategies or 
investigating the efficacy of a safety-tested vaccine candidate in the 
field are impossible in that dangerous zone, which people flee to 
many international destinations. This creates a dilemma, between:
1. deferring vax efficacy testing till the outbreak reaches other areas (risks 
millions of lives); 
2. inviting a small number of volunteers now to receive the candidate vaccine 
and then be exposed to the relevant MERS strain vs. placebo control. 
• The latter study would be extremely risky for volunteers in either arm.
• Because strain is very lethal & candidate vax, merely experimental & offered only in 1 arm. 
• But the study would accelerate effective response—with extreme societal value. 
A clarification about the case
• Animal challenge studies to test the efficacy of this vaccine candidate 
for this MERS strain would have been a third option. But assume: 
• such studies were already conducted and found this candidate efficacious in 
some species and inefficacious in others; and/or 
• current knowledge suggests that the vaccine candidate would work very 
differently in humans than in virtually all animal models. 
• In addition, animal studies take time, which, in the circumstances, 
could also translate into many, many human lives.
3. Medically high risk studies can remain (nearly) 
beneficial overall—even in health terms.
• E.g. invitations to participate could be targeted at healthy people who 
are at high risk of getting infected, e.g. healthy contacts of contacts of 
an infected person. 
• For such people, if the investigational vaccine turns out to work, they could be 
protected from an otherwise-likely extremely lethal infection.
4. Consent
• When philosophers discuss the famous counterexamples to utilitarianism 
(footbridge examples, transplant examples, the Jim and the Indians case, 
the Georgia lynch example, and many others), these usually involve 
risk/harm to an individual who is not consenting to be put at risk/harm. 
• When the individual consents to take on a risk, as study participants do in 
the case above, that should make a big ethical difference. 
• Indeed, there is a real question as to whether barring that person from taking on 
that risk isn’t too paternalistic.
• Consent to taking on an extreme net risk need not be 
irrational/uninformed/invalid, when the social benefits are tremendous.
IV. Addressing arguments for 
caps on risky humanitarian 
research
IV. Responding to arguments for caps on risky 
humanitarian research
1. To "in real-life examples, the social value of studies is never certain”
2. To London’s “principle of equality”
3. To London’s concern about loss of trust
4. To the specter of historical abuses
5. To concerns about potential (perceived) abuse
Responding to argument 1, Viz. "in real life, 
the social value of studies is never certain” 
• It is true that there is never certainty in clinical trials. 
• But a back of the envelope calculation shows that at least in our 
MERS case, societal value can be far greater than what is usually 
conceived as the plausible deontological threshold.
• Exp. social value: 50 million /  10  x  35/100  / 20  =  prevents ~87,500 deaths.
• Exp. risk to volunteers: 26 x .5  +  18 x .5  =  ~22 deaths.
• 87,500 / 22 = ~3,977.
• ~3,977 is ~100 to 200 times prevalent thresholds for permitting the killing 
of one nonconsenting innocent to prevent others from dying.
Responding to argument 2, Viz. London’s 
“principle of equality” 
For London, “as a necessary condition for ethical permissibility, research with 
human subjects must be designed and carried out so as not to undermine 
the standing of research participants as the moral and political equals of 
their compatriots, by either knowingly compromising their basic interests or 
showing unequal concern for their basic interests and the interests of the 
people the research is intended to serve” (London 2009).
• But as objection to extreme-risk trials, London’s principle rules out even:
• Many accepted trials with net-negative prospects for participants, e.g. toxicity trials.
• By implication, some legitimate policies outside medical research:
• rationing of health resources
• redistributive taxation
Responding to argument 3, Viz. London’s 
concern about loss of trust 
London points out that risky research jeopardizes “the willingness of 
community members to believe the information that they receive from basic 
social and governmental institutions, to rely on and comply with their 
instructions, and to provide various forms of cooperation and support for 
their efforts” (London 2009).
• But socially highly valuable experiments can also promote trust.
• Such experiments may also make so much headway against the infection as 
to warrant on balance some risk of decline in public trust.
• London may imagine that public trust is fully destroyed so easily that he 
would have to condemn widely-used disaster response measures.
Responding to argument 4, Viz. the specter of 
historical abuses
• Logically, the fact that many highly abusive studies contained a 
certain element, e.g. very high risk to participants, does not show 
that every study containing that element is abusive. 
Responding to argument 5, Viz. concerns 
about potential (perceived) abuse
• Other protections can provide the necessary assurances that the 
permission to conduct highly risky studies is not abused.
• No need to bar ourselves from conducting these studies when most needed. 
Conclusion
• To be able to fight threats to public health as effectively and 
expediently as we can in humanitarian research, let’s reject Caps on 
Acceptable Risk. 
• Study participants should instead be protected by other requirements from 
humanitarian researchers.
